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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ROY DRAKE IRVIN, : Case No. 2006063 8-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for two counts of Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), and 
one count of Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-210 (2005), in the Third Judicial District, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(2002). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Irvin's motion to 
dismiss one of the aggravated robbery charges where the two counts merged and 
constituted a single offense under the law. 
Standard of Review: "Merger issues present questions of law," which this Court 
will "review for correctness." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288^10, 55 P.3d 1131; see 
State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5,1(26, 128 P.3d 1179; State v. Fedorowicz. 2002 UT 67,1(59, 52 
P.3dll94. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 292-302 (motion and memorandum 
supporting motion to vacate); 367:57 (motion to vacate raised following jury verdict); 
368 (motion hearing); see State v. Wareman, 2006 UT App 327,1(28, 143 P.3d 302 ("A 
defendant can preserve a merger issue in the trial court by objecting 'either during trial, 
or following the conviction on a motion to vacate."5 (citation omitted)). 
Issue 2: Whether Irvin's private counsel provided ineffective assistance when he 
failed to object to the trial court's imposition of enhancements for use of a dangerous 
weapon, which resulted in Irvin being punished multiple times for the single act of 
carrying a dangerous weapon; and when he failed to object to the State's improper 
admission of anecdotal statistical evidence. 
Standard of Review: Where an ineffective assistance claim is "first raised on direct 
appeal," this Court will review it "as a matter of law." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); see State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32,1(20, 984 P.2d 376. 
Preservation: Ineffective assistance of counsel is an "exception[] to the 
preservation rule." State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37,1(4, 46 P.3d 230. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are determinative of the 
issues on appeal. Their text is provided in full in Addendum B. 
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United States Constitution Amendment V - Double Jeopardy; 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 12 - Double Jeopardy; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (2003) - Single Criminal Episode; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (2003) - Separate Offenses; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 2005) - Robbery; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003) - Aggravated Robbery; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (Supp. 2005) - Dangerous Weapon Enhancement; 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 - Exclusion of Relevant Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Irvin was originally charged by information with one count of Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony, and one count of Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal 
to Stop, a third degree felony. R. 2-4. On July 12, 2005, the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association (LDA) was appointed to represent Irvin. R. 13. On September 20, 2005, the 
day of the preliminary hearing, the State filed an amended information. R. 28; 29A-C. 
Along with failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, the amended information now 
charged Irvin with two counts of aggravated robbery. R. 29A-C. Following the 
preliminary hearing, the trial court bound Irvin over on all charges. R. 28-29; 363. 
On October 7, 2005, LDA filed a Motion to Suppress the Eyewitness 
Identification. R. 40-53. On November 14, 2005, the trial court granted LDA's motion, 
suppressing "any prior identifications of the defendant by alleged victim Teresa Celis," 
and "any in-court identification of the defendant by alleged victim Teresa Celis during 
the trial," but permitting "testimony from alleged victim Teresa Celis regarding any 
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description of the suspect during the incident." R. 73; 154-55; 157-58. On the first day 
of trial, December 6, 2005, LDA appeared with Irvin and moved for a mistrial after Celis 
pointed at Irvin during her testimony. R. 159-60; 365. The trial court granted LDA's 
motion. Id. On January 13, 2006, private counsel appeared on Irvin's behalf and LDA 
withdrew from the case. R. 171; 173-74. 
On the first day of trial, March 28, 2006, Irvin moved to discharge private counsel 
and have LDA reappointed because private counsel was unprepared to try his case. R. 
207-08; 366:6-9. In response to the trial court's inquiry, private counsel indicated he was 
"prepared to try this case." R. 366:9-11. The trial court denied Irvin's motion, holding, 
"Your request is out of time, and there's no basis for it. You haven't told me one thing 
that suggests that [private counsel] is not prepared the same way he was prepared the last 
time to go to trial." R. 207-08; 366:9-12. Although he did not want private counsel "to 
say one word on [his] behalf," Irvin agreed to "go along with" the trial court's ruling, and 
the trial proceeded as scheduled. R. 207-08; 366:11-12. 
During his opening statement, private counsel explained to the jury why Irvin fled 
when the officer tried to stop him. R. 366:92. Irvin did not flee because he was guilty of 
the robbery; he fled because he panicked. IdL "Mr. Irvin had a warrant out of Louisiana. 
He had written a bad check back home and knew that there was an outstanding warrant. 
He's here trying to get things going, get his life back together, and that's going to 
potentially cost him his job and potentially send him back, where here he's been making 
good progress.". IdL 
At the close of the State's case, the trial court denied private counsel's motion to 
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dismiss the aggravated robbery charges for insufficient evidence. R. 286; 367:24-27. 
Private counsel presented no evidence in Irvin's defense. R. 286; 367:27, 31. Neither 
party objected to the jury instructions. R. 287; 367:28-29. 
The trial court instructed the jury that: 
[R]obbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal 
property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means 
of force or fear. A person commits aggravated robbery if in 
the course of committing robbery, that person uses or 
threatens to use a dangerous weapon; or causes serious bodily 
injury upon another. 
R. 268; see Addendum C. It then instructed the jury that it could find Irvin guilty of the 
first count of aggravated robbery if it found: 
1. That on or about the 3rd day of July, 2005, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the defendant, Roy Drake Irvin, took 
personal property then in the possession of Fast Track 
Convenience Store, from the person or immediate presence of 
Fast Track Convenience Store; and 
2. That such taking was unlawful; 
3. That such taking was intentional; 
4. That such taking was against the will of Fast Track 
Convenience Store; 
5. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or 
fear; and 
6. That in the course of committing such taking, a dangerous 
weapon was used. 
R. 269; see Addendum C. And the jury could find Irvin guilty of the second count of 
aggravated robbery if it found: 
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1. That on or about the 3r day of July, 2005, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, Roy Drake Irvin, took personal property then in the 
possession of Teresa Celis, from the person or immediate presence of 
Teresa Celis; and 
2. That such taking was unlawful; 
3. That such taking was intentional; 
4. That such taking was against the will of Teresa Celis; 
5. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or fear; and 
6. That in the course of committing such taking, a dangerous weapon was 
used. 
R. 270; see Addendum C. 
During closing argument, the State argued, "As far as fleeing, I think it was 
admitted in evidence that he did flee. He said he had warrants. It was true in this case, 
but it's a convenient excuse. You heard the officer testify they all say they have 
warrants, that's why he ran. I think he ran for another reason, because he was in a stolen 
car, because he had taken it earlier that night." R. 367:35. During closing argument for 
the defense, private counsel stated: 
[Y]ou know [the prosecutor] has stated that, well, they all say 
they have warrants, so that's not a valid reason. I don't know 
if that's true or not, but in this case there was a warrant. [Irvin] 
did have a warrant, and that's why he ran. He panicked. You 
know, I don't know what happened in other cases, but we 
know what happened in this case, he had a warrant. He had a 
warrant that he knew about. 
R. 367:36-37. Following deliberations, the jury found Irvin guilty as charged. R. 283-
85; 367:54-55. After the jury was excused, private counsel moved "to merge Counts 1 
and 2." R. 267:56-57. The trial court allowed time for the parties to prepare briefs on the 
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motion. R. 367:57. 
On April 10, 2006, private counsel filed a Motion to Vacate Conviction for 
Aggravated Robbery, arguing the two aggravated robbery charges were "properly subject 
to merger pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402 and Utah case law." R. 292. In 
the accompanying memorandum, private counsel explained, "The acts for which [Irvin] 
was convicted were part of a single criminal episode. The events were closely connected 
in time and were executed with a single criminal purpose and therefore represent a single 
criminal act." R. 301. "In addition, case law which is analogous to this case supports the 
conclusion that the Aggravated Robbery statute provides alternate means of proving that 
an aggravated robbery has occurred. The Aggravated Robbery statute allows 
enhancement of the Robbery statute for sentencing purposes, but each enhancing factor 
does not create a new crime." R. 301. 
The State responded to Irvin's motion on May 9, 2006. R. 305. A motion hearing 
was held on May 11, 2006. R. 313; 368. In response to the trial court's question, private 
counsel explained that it did not "make any difference" whether there was one victim or 
two because "it's still a single criminal episode, single criminal objective close in time." 
R. 368:6. Private counsel continued, "[TJhere is only one robbery that occurs in this 
case." R. 368:7. "[T]o find otherwise would put us in a position that any robbery where 
someone takes a vehicle and uses a dangerous weapon to accomplish that taking is 
automatically converted into two aggravated robberies. Or in a case where property is 
taken, a dangerous weapon is used and a serious physical injury is inflicted, that would 
also be, under the theory that the State puts forward, two counts of aggravated robbery." 
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Id. Following argument, the trial court denied private counsel's motion because "once 
the initial crime," "the robbery—taking the money by force and fear—is completed and 
then there's a second type of property taken from—in this case, this is her personal 
property that's being taken . . . through force or fear, you've got a second crime." R. 
368:25-26; see Addendum D. The trial court then noted the issue was an "interesting" 
one and "perhaps it ought to be visited in the appellate courts." R. 368:26. 
On June 9, 2006, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 
318-20; see Addendum E. The trial court concluded "[t]aking the money from the store 
cash register completed the first, separate offense of Aggravated Robbery." R. 319. 
"The defendant began a second, separate offense of Aggravated Robbery when he took 
the victim's personal car keys, removed her to the back of the store, talked about tying 
her up, and told her to stay there. When he then took the victim's motor vehicle, the 
defendant completed the second, separate offense of Aggravated Robbery." Id, 
Also on June 9, the trial court conducted sentencing proceedings. R. 315-17; 369. 
During the proceedings, the trial court gave private counsel "an opportunity to be heard 
on whether or not the year enhancement applies to this sentence, which would make this 
six to life as opposed to five to life." R. 369:10; see Addendum F. Private counsel said 
he had not "looked at that," but did not "believe there's any reason not to impose [the 
enhancements] at this point." R. 369:10-11. Imposing enhancements for each 
aggravated robbery charge, the trial court sentenced Irvin to two terms of six years to life 
and one term of zero to five years in prison. R. 315-16; 369:11-13. The trial court ran 
the sentences for the aggravated robbery charges concurrently and consecutively to the 
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failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop charge. R. 316; 369:13. 
On July 3, 2006, private counsel filed a notice of appeal on Irvin's behalf and 
moved to withdraw as counsel. R. 324; 328. On July 11, 2006, the trial court appointed 
LDA to represent Irvin on appeal. R. 343. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Teresa Celis testified she was working at Fast Track convenience store on July 3, 
2005. R. 366:94-95. At around 7:00 pm, "an African-American gentleman came in." Id. 
at 95-96. He went to the ATM machine "and then he left." Id at 102. A half hour later, 
"the same gentleman came in and went to the ATM." Id, The man put a "comdata card" 
in the ATM, said "My money is still not there," and left again. Id. at 102-04. 
Twenty minutes later, the man returned again. R. 366:104-05. This time, after 
visiting the ATM machine, he "turned right around and walked up to the counter and 
asked [Celis] for a pack of Cool super long cigarettes and Cigarollas cigar." Id. at 105, 
125. These items "were on the wall behind" Celis. Id at 105-06. Celis "got the 
cigarettes" and "set them on the counter." Id. at 106. "Then he asked for the Cigarollas," 
which were "a little bit lower." Id. Celis "turned around" to retrieve the Cigarollas cigar 
and, "as [she] did that," the man came around the counter and stood "right in [her] face" 
with "a knife right in front o f her. IcL at 106-07, 125. The man ordered her to open the 
register and give him the money. Id at 108-09, 128-29. After Celis gave the man the 
money, the man ordered her to give him her keys. IcL at 110. Celis' keys were in her 
purse, which was next to the cigarette case. Id. She gave him her keys. Id. at 110-11. 
Next, the man ordered her into the backroom. IcL at 111. In the backroom, the man 
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looked around for something to tie her up with. Id, at 112. Celis said, "Nobody is here. 
You got my keys. You got the money. You should just go." Id at 112-13. The man 
ordered Celis to stay in the backroom. Id at 113. Celis promised to stay for five minutes 
and the man left. Id at 113, 131-32. After she heard the man leave, Celis called the 
police. Id at 114, 132-33. 
Celis described the man to the police as "an African-American male," "probably 
in his 30's," "5'8 and 170 pounds," and wearing "a gray T-shirt," "dark colored" 
"jogging, baggy-type pants," a "dark color" visor, and tennis shoes. R. 366:114-15, 134. 
Celis did not identify Irvin as the man who robbed the convenience store. Id. at 114-15. 
There was a surveillance system in the convenience store, but it did not record the 
incident. Id. at 115. 
Officer Troy Anderson was on duty on the late evening of July 3. R. 366:142. At 
approximately 2:00 am on July 4, Officer Anderson spotted Celis' car, which had been 
reported as stolen. Id at 143-45. Officer Anderson initiated a traffic stop. Id at 145. 
Rather than stopping, Celis' vehicle accelerated. Id at 146. A low-speed chase ensued, 
which ended when Celis' vehicle turned into a dead-end alley. Id at 148-49. The 
vehicle stopped, and the "occupant jumped out" and "fled on foot." Id at 150. Officer 
Anderson gave chase and caught the suspect. Id at 150-51. Officer Anderson identified 
Irvin as the suspect. Id at 151-52. At the time Officer Anderson apprehended Irvin, he 
was wearing a "white shirt," "dark" "sweat pants," and a dark visor. Id at 152. Irvin had 
"over $300" in cash stuffed "in his sock." R. 366:154, 157. 
Officer Anderson testified that "[t]ypically," people who flee from police say they 
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fled "because they thought they had warrants." R. 366:155; see Addendum G. "Probably 
90 percent of the time if you ask, 'Why did you run?' They will say, 'Because I have 
warrants.'" Id He based this conclusion on the "dozen, give or take" foot chases he had 
participated in during his career. Id. Private counsel did not object to this evidence. Id. 
Officer Anderson testified Irvin had a warrant out for his arrest when he fled. Id. at 158. 
Detective Ralph Anderson investigated this case. At the police station, Detective 
Anderson saw Irvin. R. 366:165. Irvin was "wearing a white tank top, some navy cotton 
work pants, lo[o]se fitting, and . . . a tennis visor." IcL He described Irvin as "a male, 
black, adult," in his "mid 30's to mid 40's." Id. at 166. Irvin was carrying a comdata 
card and $447 in is wallet, his pants pocket and his sock. Id at 168, 171, 181. The 
convenience store was missing $1,105. Id. at 181. Detective Anderson seized from the 
vehicle a pack of Cool 100s cigarettes and two bandanas. Id, at 174. No usable 
fingerprints were recovered from the investigation. Id. at 185, 190-92, 193-94, 197-201. 
Officer David Kircher testified he was on duty on July 3, 2005, and assisted in the 
robbery investigation. R. 367:10-11. He ordered another officer to secure the 
convenience store and interviewed Celis. Id. at 11. He did not believe there were any 
good surfaces for lifting fingerprints. Id. at 12-16. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, this Court should merge Irvin's convictions for aggravated robbery because 
charging Irvin twice for aggravated robbery violated the double jeopardy clauses of the 
United States and Utah Constitutions. In Utah, a single larcenous taking of property, 
whether owned by one or several individuals, will be treated as a single criminal offense. 
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Alternatively, when dealing with crimes against the person, a single criminal act will 
constitute as many offenses as there are victims of violence. In this case, regardless of 
whether this Court classifies aggravated robbery as a crime against property or a crime 
against the person, the result is the same. If it was a crime against property, the multiple 
ownership of the property taken is immaterial because there was only one intent and, 
therefore, one offense. Likewise, if it was a crime against the person, there was only one 
victim of an act of violence and, therefore, one offense, even though there were two 
victims of the larcenous act. Thus, this Court should reverse because the trial court erred 
by denying Irvin's motion to vacate one of the aggravated robbery charges. 
Second, this Court should reverse because private counsel provided ineffective 
assistance when he failed to object to the trial court's decision to enhance Irvin's 
aggravated robbery charges. To demonstrate ineffective assistance, a defendant must 
first identify specific acts or omissions demonstrating that counsel's representation failed 
to meet an objective standard of reasonableness, and second show that but for counsel's 
deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would 
have been different. 
It is deficient performance if counsel fails to raise an argument because he merely 
overlooks it. This is true even if the issue counsel overlooked was an open question in 
our courts. In this case, the record shows private counsel did not forego an objection to 
the enhancements for any strategic reason. Moreover, private counsel was not excused 
from challenging the enhancements because less than a year before the sentencing 
proceedings in Irvin's case, our supreme court explained the double jeopardy 
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implications of applying the dangerous weapon enhancement statute to an aggravated 
robbery charge and invited defense attorneys to raise the issue. Thus, because imposing 
the enhancements in Irvin's case violated the double jeopardy clauses of both the United 
States and Utah constitutions, private counsel provided deficient performance by making 
no effort to prevent their imposition. 
Specifically, enhancing the aggravated robbery charges violated the federal due 
process clause because the Utah Legislature, if it intended to doubly punish defendants 
for using a dangerous weapon, did not make this intent clear in the statute. Enhancing the 
aggravated robbery charges also violated the Utah double jeopardy clause because, like 
the Montana Constitution, the Utah Constitution prohibits the double punishment of a 
single offense, regardless of the Legislature's intent. Further, even if the United States 
and Utah constitutions allow the dangerous weapon enhancement to be applied to an 
aggravated robbery charge, the double jeopardy clauses were still violated in this case 
because both aggravated robbery charges were enhanced for use of a dangerous weapon, 
even though just one weapon was used. 
Third, private counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the 
State's admission of anecdotal statistical evidence. Probabilities cannot conclusively 
establish that a single event did or did not occur and are particularly inappropriate when 
used to establish facts not susceptible to quantitative analysis, such as whether a 
particular individual is telling the truth at any given time. Thus, even where statistically 
valid probability evidence has been presented, Utah courts have routinely excluded it 
because it invites the jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion 
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rather than to analyze the evidence before it and decide where truth lies. In this case, the 
State presented anecdotal statistical evidence that 90 percent of people who flee say they 
fled not because they were guilty of a particular crime, but because they had warrants. 
This evidence lacked foundation and encouraged the jury to reject Irvin's defense based 
on how other defendants acted, rather than on the evidence. Thus, the evidence was 
inadmissible under rule 403 and should have been objected to. Private counsel, however, 
did not object, thereby allowing the State to rob Irvin of the force of his defense by 
transforming his excuse for fleeing into a apparent example of his dishonest character. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD MERGE IRVIN'S AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY CONVICTIONS BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED BY DENYING IRVIN'S MOTION TO VACATE ONE 
OF THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY COUNTS 
The Double Jeopardy clauses of the United States and Utah constitutions prohibit 
the State from punishing a person twice for the same offense. U.S. Const. V; Utah Const. 
art. I, § 12; State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179,1(11, 72 P.3d 692, cert, denied, 84 P.3d 239 
(2003). As explained by the Utah Code, a "defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, 
when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act 
shall be punishable under only one such provision." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) 
(2003). A "single criminal episode" encompasses "all conduct which is closely related in 
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time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (2003). 
Specifically, in Utah, a "single larcenous taking of property, whether owned by 
one or several individuals, will be treated as a single criminal offense." State v. Barker, 
624 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1981). "This conclusion is based on the premise that if the 
taking . . . constitutes but a single act, then there is but one offense and the multiple 
ownership of the property taken is immaterial." Id Its purpose "is to prevent the 
aggregation of criminal penalties for a single act and stems from the presupposition of 
our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of the penal code against the imposition of a 
harsher punishment." Id at 696 (citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955); 
Sweek v. People, 277 P. 1 (Colo. 1929) ("This is a humane rule... . If each article stolen 
were of a value sufficient to make the crime a felony, and a separate charge could be filed 
as to each, a defendant, if convicted, might be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of 
his life.")). 
For example, in State v. Kimbel 620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980), the defendant was 
charged with one count of theft, a third degree felony, based on two acts of theft 
committed over the course of a day. Kimbel, 620 P.2d at 515. On appeal, the defendant 
argued he should have been charged with two counts of misdemeanor theft rather than 
one count of felony theft. Id. at 517-18. Our supreme court held the "fact that the taking 
took place at different times is not dispositive" of whether the defendant should be 
charged with one count or two. Instead, the "crucial consideration" is the "intent of the 
thief." Id at 518. 
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"[T]he general test as to whether there are separate offenses or 
one offense is whether the evidence discloses one general 
intent or discloses separate and distinct intents. The particular 
facts and circumstances of each case determine this question. 
If there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one 
plan, even though there is a series of transactions, there is but 
one offense." 
Kimbel, 620 P.2d at 518 (citation omitted) (alteration in original). Thus, because the 
"trial court and jury necessarily concluded that the thefts were part of a continuing plan," 
our supreme court affirmed the single count of felony theft despite "the fact that the 
actual takings occurred at different times on the same day." Id 
Similarly, in State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), the defendant was 
charged with three counts of theft stemming from separate acts of misappropriation over 
a period of months. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 639. On appeal, the defendant argued his 
attorney offered ineffective assistance of counsel "by not timely objecting to the 
information in which Crosby was charged with three counts of theft instead of one 
count." Id. at 645. Reversing, our supreme court held that although there was "a series 
of transactions" utilizing "different methods to divert the cash" over a "period of time," 
there was "but one offense" because the defendant operated under "one general intent." 
IdL at 645-46; see also State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (reversing 
where defendant was convicted of two counts of theft after he broke into a home and 
stole property and a gun, because defendant should only have been convicted of one 
count); State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983) (reversing where defendant was charged 
with multiple counts of retaining stolen property after he received property stolen from 
16 
different victims at different times all at once, because defendant should only have been 
convicted of one count). 
In this case, the two aggravated robbery charges stemmed from a single criminal 
episode. The conduct charged was closely related in time. The money and car keys were 
stolen within moments of each other and the entire encounter lasted less than twenty 
minutes. R. 366:110, 131. It was also "incident to the accomplishment of a single 
criminal objective, namely to [rob the convenience store] and avoid being caught." State 
v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Accordingly, Irvin could only be 
prosecuted once for each act within the single criminal episode. Utah Code Ann. §76-1-
402(1) (2003). 
The Utah Code classifies aggravated robbery as a crime against property. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 & -302. It is a larcenous act distinguished from theft by its 
additional requirements that the property be taken from a person or the person's 
immediate presence by means of force or fear. Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 
(2003) and 76-6-301 & -302. As such, aggravated robbery is subject to Utah's "single 
larcenous taking" rule. Barker, 624 P.2d at 695. As in Kimbel where our supreme court 
held two acts of theft committed over the course of a day constituted just one offense, and 
in Crosby, where our supreme court held multiple acts of misappropriation using 
different methods over a period of months constituted just one offense, this Court should 
hold Irvin's two counts of aggravated robbery should have merged into one count. 
The State alleged Irvin, using a knife, robbed a convenience store clerk of the 
money in her cash register and her car keys. The evidence showed the robbery happened 
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all at once—it was a single act conducted with a single intent. Thus, it does not matter 
whether the items stolen were "owned by one or several individuals." Barker, 624 P.2d 
at 695. Under the single larcenous taking rule, there was "one offense and the multiple 
ownership of the property taken is immaterial." IdL 
If, on the other hand, this Court chooses to look at aggravated robbery as a crime 
against the person, the result is the same. When dealing with "crimes against the person 
(as contrasted with crimes against property), a single criminal act or episode may 
constitute as many offenses as there are victims." State v. James, 631 P.2d 854, 855 
(Utah 1981). "A defendant who commits an act of violence with intent to harm more 
than one person or by a means likely to cause harm to several persons is more culpable 
than a defendant who harms only one person." Id. 
For example, in James, the defendant was charged with five counts of kidnapping 
after he held five customers hostage following an armed robbery. James, 631 P.2d at 
855. On appeal, our supreme court upheld the five counts because the "five kidnappings 
constituted separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode." Id; see also State 
v. Gambrell 814 P.2d 1136, 1140-41 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding defendant could be 
charged with three counts of negligent homicide where "several persons were killed in 
one automobile accident); State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 63-64 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding defendant could be convicted of murder and two counts of aggravated assault 
even though various "shootings were part of a single criminal episode"). 
In this case, there were ultimately two victims of a larcenous act (which does not 
matter under the single larcenous act rule), but there was only one victim of an act of 
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violence. Celis was the only person approached in the convenience store and she was the 
only person against whom force or fear was used. Thus, because there was only one 
victim of violence, there was only one offense. In other words, regardless of whether this 
Court defines aggravated robbery as a crime against property or a crime against a person, 
the result is the same—there was just one aggravated robbery. Thus, this Court should 
reverse because the trial court erred by denying Irvin's motion to vacate one of the 
aggravated robbery charges. 
IL THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY 
FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGES, AND BY FAILING 
TO OBJECT TO THE ANECDOTAL STATISTICAL 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant 
the right to "effective assistance of counsel." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990). "The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), set forth the analytical framework for deciding ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). 
"'The benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."5 Id (citation omitted). To 
determine whether counsel provided effective assistance, Utah courts rely on the test 
established in Strickland. See State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5,^23, 84 P.3d 1183. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 
the Strickland test, "a defendant must show (1) that counsel's 
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performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's 
deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the trial would have been different" . . . . [I]n 
making this evaluation, the court must "indulge in the strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is[,] the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy." 
Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
In this case, defense counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to 
object to the trial court's decision to enhance each of Irvin's aggravated robbery charges, 
and when he failed to object to the State's use of anecdotal statistical evidence. 
A. Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance When He Failed to Object to the 
Trial Court's Decision to Enhance the Aggravated Robbery Charges. 
As explained below, private counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness when he failed to object to the trial court's decision to 
enhance each of Irvin's aggravated robbery charges. Moreover, this Court should reverse 
because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different but for private counsel's deficient performance. 
1. Private Counsel's Performance Was So Deficient As to Fall Below an 
Objective Standard of Reasonableness. 
"To prevail on the first prong of the [Strickland] test, a defendant 'must identify 
specific acts or omissions demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to meet an 
objective standard of reasonableness.'" Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at ^24 (citation omitted). 
Appellate courts "will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, 
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however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect." Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). "A defendant must therefore overcome the strong 
presumptions that counsel's performance fell 'within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance' and that 'under the circumstances, the challenged action "might 
be considered sound trial strategy."5" Id (citations omitted). "Indeed," this Court has 
said "an ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic 
or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." Id at 468 (citations omitted). 
It is deficient performance if counsel fails to raise an argument because he "merely 
overlooks]" it. State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In 
Moritzsky, defendant argued his counsel was ineffective for providing a defense of 
habitation instruction that did not include "the statutory presumption" of reasonableness. 
Moritzsky, 771 P.2d at 692. On appeal, this Court reversed because there was "no 
tactical explanation for requesting a defense of habitation instruction without inclusion of 
the beneficial presumption." Id Rather, it appeared "counsel merely overlooked the 
statutory presumption by failing to check the 'pocket-part' of the Utah Code." Id.; 
compare State v. Maht 2005 UT App 494,ffi[19, 21, 125 P.3d 103 (holding counsel not 
ineffective for not accepting curative instruction because it was "plausible, and even 
likely," that counsel had legitimate strategy to "not respond to the judge's offer to instruct 
the jury about the incarceration evidence because he did not want to draw further 
attention to the testimony"); State v. Bryant. 965 P.2d 539, 543 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(holding counsel not ineffective for failing to compel alibi attendance, even though 
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record "silent" as to counsel's "subjective intent," because there were "rational bases" for 
counsel's conduct). 
This holds true even if the issue counsel overlooked "was an open question in our 
courts." State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26,1|32, 135 P.3d 864. In Ison, defendant was charged 
with communications fraud, stemming from his "alleged misdeeds" that "frustrate[ed] the 
vacation plans of would-be" cruise passengers. Id. at ^[1. At trial, defendant's counsel 
made no attempt to admit a report previously made by an administrative law judge (ALJ) 
that found defendant "'made no misrepresentations to any passenger' and never 'assumed 
responsibility for the cruise and tour bookings in question.'" Id. at %9. Both this Court 
and our supreme court held the defendant received ineffective assistance because neither 
court was "persuaded" that defendant's counsel could "be excused for not seeking to 
introduce the ALJ's finding" simply because the issue of whether the ALJ report was 
admissible "was an open question in our courts." Id. at f32; see State v. Ison, 2004 UT 
App 252,^16, 96 P.3d 374. 
"[Tjhere was no strategic reason not to seek admission of the ALJ's findings." 
Ison, 2006 UT 26 at p 2 . Defendant "would have alerted his counsel that the ALJ had 
exonerated him." IcL "Indeed, is it possible that [defendant] did not have feelings of 
indignation upon learning that he was facing criminal charges based on the same alleged 
misrepresentations that the ALJ had found he did not make?" IcL "The ALJ's findings 
were potentially very powerful exculpatory evidence." IcL "Surely, competent counsel 
would scour the exceptions to the hearsay rule in search of a means to place the findings 
in the hands of the jury." Id. Thus, despite the fact that the admissibility of the ALJ 
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report was "an open question in our courts," both this Court and our supreme court held 
defendant "was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel based on [counsel's] failure to 
offer into evidence the ALJ's findings." Id at Tf34; see Ison, 2004 UT App at [^16. 
The Double Jeopardy clauses of the United States and Utah constitutions prohibit 
the government from punishing a person twice for the same offense. U.S. Const. V; Utah 
Const, art. I, § 12; Smith, 2003 UT App 179 at Ifl 1. Under the Utah Code, a person who 
"unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the 
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means 
of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or 
temporarily of the personal property," is guilty of robbery, a second degree felony. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1), (3) (Supp. 2005). If the person "uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon" in the course of committing the robbery, however, then the Utah 
Legislature says he is guilty of a greater offense—aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony. Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-302(1), (2). 
Separately, the Utah Legislature has enacted a dangerous weapon enhancement 
statute: 
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
dangerous weapon was used in commission or furtherance of a 
felony, the court: 
(a)(i) shall increase by one year the minimum term of the 
sentence applicable by law; and 
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence 
applicable by law in the case of a felony of the second or third 
degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (Supp. 2005). 
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Prior to 1995, the dangerous weapon enhancement statute "singlfed] out firearms," 
rather than "encompass[ing] all 'dangerous weapons.5" State v. Montiel 2005 UT 48,^2 
n.2, 122 P.2d 571 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Case law addressing the pre-
1995 firearms enhancement statute "supported] the proposition that a defendant charged 
with a crime for which use of a dangerous weapon is an element may still be subject to an 
enhanced penalty when that weapon is a firearm." Id. (citing State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 
186, 192 (Utah 1988); State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah 1978); State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65, 85-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Neither this Court nor our supreme court has 
addressed the issue of whether "the penalty for aggravated robbery may still be enhanced 
for use of a dangerous weapon even though use of a dangerous weapon is an element of 
the substantive offense." Id 
In this case, private counsel provided deficient performance when he failed to 
object to the trial court's decision to enhance both of Irvin's aggravated robbery charges 
in violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Utah constitutions. It 
is clear from the record that private counsel did not forego an objection to the 
enhancements for any strategic reason. R. 369:10-11. Rather, he simply had not "looked 
at" the issue and, rather than requesting time to research it, simply stated that he did not 
"believe there's any reason not to impose [the enhancements] at this point." Id. This 
lack of preparation gave credence to Irvin's pretrial motion to discharge private counsel 
because private counsel was not prepared to try his case. R. 366:6-9. 
Moreover, private counsel was not excused from challenging the enhancements 
simply because the issue is an open question in our courts. See Ison, 2006 UT 26 at ^ [32. 
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Less than one year before the sentencing proceedings in Irvin's case, our supreme court 
explained the possible double jeopardy implications of applying the dangerous weapon 
enhancement statute to an aggravated robbery charge and invited defense attorneys to 
raise the issue. See Montiel, 2005 UT 48 at [^2 n.2. Because imposing the enhancements 
in Irvin's case violated the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Utah 
constitutions, private counsel provided deficient performance by making no effort to 
prevent their imposition. 
a. Imposing the Dangerous Weapon Enhancements on Irvin 's Aggravated 
Robbery Charges Violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United 
States Constitution. 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal Double Jeopardy 
Clause "'to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible 
conviction more than once for an alleged offense.'5' Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 
365 (1983) (citation omitted). "With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single 
trial," the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents "the sentencing court from prescribing 
greater punishment than the legislature intended." Id. at 366. The "rule of statutory 
construction" applied when deciding what the legislature intended is the assumption 
"'that Congress ordinarily, does not intend to punish the same offense under two different 
statutes. Accordingly, where two statutory provisions proscribe the "same offense," they 
are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear 
indication of contrary legislative intent.'" Id. (citations omitted) (emphases in original). 
If, however, the legislature makes "its intent crystal clear," then "a court's task of 
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statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury 
may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial." IcL at 368-69. 
In this case, it was error to impose the dangerous weapon enhancements in 
addition to the sentences for aggravated robbery because it is not clear the Utah 
Legislature intended to impose cumulative punishments for the use of a dangerous 
weapon during an aggravated robbery. 
The Utah Legislature has made its general intent concerning cumulative 
punishments clear: "A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of 
a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1). Similarly, a 
"defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not 
be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so 
included when . . . [i]t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(3)(a). The "motivating principle behind" the Utah Legislature's enactment of this 
merger doctrine was "to prevent violations of constitutional double jeopardy protection." 
State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57,1(7, 122 P.3d 615 (citations omitted). 
"'[Enhancement statutes are different in nature than other criminal statutes' 
because they single out particular characteristics of criminal conduct as warranting 
harsher punishment." Smith, 2005 UT 57 at If 10 (citation omitted). "[Wjhere the 
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legislature intended a statute to be an enhancement statute, the merger doctrine set forth 
in section 76-l-402[] does not apply." Smith, 2005 UT 57 at 1J9 (citation omitted). If the 
legislature "intends to preclude section 76-l-402[] from requiring merger in a specific 
instance/5 however, "it must clearly indicate that the provision in question is intended to 
enhance the penalty for one type of offense when certain characteristics are present that 
independently constitute a different offense." Smith, 2005 UT 57 at ^11. "Only when 
such an explicit indication of legislative intent is present in the specific offense statute 
will we consider it appropriate to exempt that statute from operation of the general 
merger requirements in section 76-l-402[]." Id 
"An example of such an express indication appears in Utah Code section 76-6-
202, which first defines the crime of burglary as unlawfully entering or remaining in a 
building with the intent to commit certain listed offenses, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
202(1 )(a)-(g) (2003), and then specifies that a violation of the burglary statute is a 
'separate offense' from any of those offenses so listed, id, § 76-6-202(3)." Smith, 2005 
UT 57 at Tfl 1 n.3. "This language makes clear that the burglary statute imposes an 
enhanced penalty on those who would otherwise be considered guilty of the lesser crime 
of criminal trespass,.. . where that crime is committed in conjunction with an intent to 
commit one of the listed offenses." Id 
Neither the aggravated robbery statute nor the dangerous weapon enhancement 
statute contain the necessary "explicit indication" of the legislature's intent to 
cumulatively punish a defendant's use of a dangerous weapon during a robbery. If a 
person commits robbery without a dangerous weapon then he is guilty of a second degree 
27 
felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(3). If a person uses a dangerous weapon during a 
robbery, then he is guilty of the greater offense of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(2). Similar to the aggravated robbery statute, the 
dangerous weapon enhancement statute enhances the punishment of a defendant for use 
of a "dangerous weapon . . . in the commission or furtherance of a felony." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.8(2). The legislature did not include any language in the dangerous 
weapon enhancement statute to indicate that it was explicitly overriding the plain 
language of section 76-1-402 and making the dangerous weapon enhancement a 
mechanism to doubly punish use of a dangerous weapon. Id. 
Before the 1995 amendment of the dangerous weapon enhancement statute, the 
legislature made clear its intent to doubly punish use of a firearm by expressly limiting 
the application of the enhancement statute to firearms, rather than all dangerous weapons. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1994) (firearms enhancement statute); Montiel 2005 
UT 48 at 1|2 n.2 (citing Speer, 750 P.2d at 192; Angus, 581 P.2d at 995; Webb, 790 P.2d 
at 85-87). Such a limitation made crystal clear the legislature's determination that "the 
use of firearms" is "innately more dangerous" than the use of other dangerous weapons 
and is "therefore more deserving of punishment." Angus, 581 P.2d at 995. If the 
legislature wanted to make its intent to doubly punish use of all dangerous weapons 
during a robbery when it amended the enhancement statute in 1995 to apply to all 
dangerous weapons, then it had to again make its intent crystal clear. The legislature 
chose not to enact any language making clear its intent to doubly punish use of a 
dangerous weapon during the commission of a robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
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203.8(2). Absent "such an explicit indication of legislative intent/' this Court should 
look to "the general merger requirements in section 76-1 -402[]" and hold the dangerous 
weapon enhancement merges into aggravated robbery when the aggravating factor 
charged was use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon. Smith, 2005 UT 57 at <|[ 11. 
b. Imposing the Dangerous Weapons Enhancements on Irvin Js Aggravated 
Robbery Charges Violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Utah 
Constitution. 
"[T]he double jeopardy guarantees afforded defendants under the Utah 
Constitution are different from and provide greater protection than those afforded by the 
United States Constitution." State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103,1(23, 104 P.3d 1250 (citing 
State v.Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 709-10 & n.18 (Utah 1990) (observing that the federal 
double jeopardy protection is "instructive," but nevertheless conducting a separate 
analysis pursuant to the Utah Constitution); State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358-60 
(Utah 1979) (articulating and applying a distinct double jeopardy standard under the Utah 
Constitution that was formulated before the federal double jeopardy clause was made 
applicable to the states)). 
This Court should interpret Utah's double jeopardy clause different than the 
federal double jeopardy clause and hold it "cannot reasonably be interpreted to leave 
legislatures completely free to subject a defendant to the risk of multiple punishment on 
the basis of a single criminal transaction." Hunter, 459 U.S. at 373 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). This Court has looked to Montana previously when interpreting Utah's 
double jeopardy clause, and should look to Montana again in this case. Taylorsville City 
v. Adkins, 2006 UT App 374,^13 n.2, 145 P.3d 1161. 
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The Montana Constitution guarantees "[n]o person shall be again put in jeopardy 
for the same offense previously tried in any jurisdiction." Mont. Const, art. II, § 25. In 
State v. Guillaume, 975 P.2d 312 (Mt. 1999), the Supreme Court of Montana faced the 
issue of whether "it is a violation of double jeopardy" to "apply the weapon enhancement 
statute" when "use of a weapon is an element of the underlying offense." Guillaume, 975 
P.2d at 315. Criticizing the United States Supreme Court's reasoning that the federal 
double jeopardy clause hinges on clear legislative intent, the Montana Supreme Court 
interpreted its own constitution to prohibit applying a weapon enhancement statute when 
use of a weapon is an element of the underlying offense. Id. at 316. 
The Montana Supreme Court held its constitution "provides greater protection 
from double jeopardy than is provided by the United States Constitution." Guillaume, 
975 P.2d at 315. The Montana Constitution "'vests in the courts the exclusive power to 
construe and interpret legislative Acts, as well as provisions of the Constitution. Inherent 
in this power is the responsibility to determine whether a particular law conforms to the 
Constitution.'" Id at 316 (citation omitted). Moreover, "[constitutional guarantees are 
not mere vessels to be left empty or filled at the whim of the legislative branch. Rather, 
they have intrinsic meaning which is independent of any legislative intent." Id (citation 
omitted). Thus, "pursuant to [its] duty to safeguard the rights and guarantees provided 
by" its state constitution, "and notwithstanding legislative intent," the Montana Supreme 
Court held "the application of the weapon enhancement statute to felony convictions 
where the underlying offense requires proof of use of a weapon violates the double 
jeopardy provision . . . of the Montana Constitution." Guillaume, 975 P.2d at 316. 
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In reaching its decision, the Montana Supreme Court was "guided by the 
fundamental principle embodied in double jeopardy. Simply put, double jeopardy 
exemplifies the legal and moral concept that no person should suffer twice for a single 
act." IdL at 316. "The only factor raising [defendant's] charge from misdemeanor assault 
to felony assault was his use of a weapon." Id at 317. The Montana Supreme Court 
"interpreted] this distinction between the two offenses, and the different penalties 
imposed by each offense, as the legislature's way of punishing a criminal defendant for 
use of a weapon in committing an assault." Id "Thus, when the weapon enhancement 
statute was applied to [defendant's] felony assault conviction, [defendant] was subjected 
to double punishment for use of a weapon: once when the charge was elevated from 
misdemeanor assault to felony assault, and again when the weapon enhancement statute 
was applied." Id. Reversing, the Montana Supreme Court held "this form of double 
punishment is exactly what double jeopardy was intended to prohibit." Id 
Following the reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court, this Court should 
interpret Utah's Double Jeopardy Clause to prohibit convicting Irvin of aggravated 
robbery based on his alleged use of a firearm during a robbery and then enhancing Irvin's 
conviction based on his use of a firearm. Utah's double jeopardy provision, like 
Montana's, provides people greater protections than those provided by the United States 
Constitution. See Harris, 2004 UT 103 at ^[23; Trafhy, 799 P.2d at 709-10 & n.18; 
Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 358-60. The Framers of the Utah Constitution did not intend the 
Constitution to be a blank slate on which the legislature could impose its will. See Utah 
Const, art. V, § 1 ("The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided 
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into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others."); State v. 
Merrill 2005 UT 34^27, 114 P.3d 585 (holding "the separation of powers provision 
found in article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution imposes a limit on legislative 
power"). Rather, the Framers intended the Constitution to be a set of guidelines defining 
the boundaries in which the legislature could act. See id If Utah's provision against 
being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense "is to have any real meaning," the Utah 
Legislature "cannot be allowed to convict a defendant two, three, or more times simply 
by enacting separate statutory provisions defining nominally distinct crimes." Hunter, 
459 U.S. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Thus, the trial court's imposition of the dangerous weapon enhancements in 
addition to Irvin's two aggravated robbery convictions violated Utah's double jeopardy 
clause. Accordingly, this Court should reverse because trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel when he failed to object to the trial court's imposition of the 
dangerous weapon enhancements. 
c. Imposing the Dangerous Weapon Enhancement Twice, Once for Each 
Aggravated Robbery Charge, Violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of 
the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
As explained above, the Double Jeopardy clauses of the United States and Utah 
constitutions prohibit the State from punishing a person twice for the same offense. U.S. 
Const. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Smith, 2003 UT App 179 at^jll. In keeping with these 
guarantees, the Utah Code says a "defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal 
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action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when 
the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which 
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (2003). A 
"single criminal episode" encompasses "all conduct which is closely related in time and 
is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (2003). 
When dealing with "crimes against the person (as contrasted with crimes against 
property), a single criminal act or episode may constitute as many offenses as there are 
victims." James, 631 P.2d at 855. "A defendant who commits an act of violence with 
intent to harm more than one person or by a means likely to cause harm to several 
persons is more culpable than a defendant who harms only one person." Id, In this case, 
Irvin was charged with threatening one person with one knife one time. R. 2-4; 366-67. 
That Irvin was charged with taking two items does not change this fact. See supra at Part 
1. As discussed in section I, Irvin's action constituted one offense. See id. If the 
dangerous weapon enhancement was applicable at all, it should only have been applied 
once. See id. Thus, it was error to apply the dangerous weapon enhancement twice in 
Irvin's case, once for each aggravated robbery charge. 
2. This Court Should Reverse Because But For Private Counsel's Deficient 
Performance, There Is a Reasonable Likelihood the Outcome of the Case 
Would Have Been Different 
To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must show that "but 
for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
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the trial would have been different." Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at ^23 (citations omitted). In 
this case, there is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different 
but for private counsel's failure to object to the trial court's decision to impose the 
dangerous weapon enhancement to each of the aggravated robbery charges. 
The ultimate result of trial counsel's deficient performance was to ensure Irvin 
was punished multiple times for his single use of a dangerous weapon. First, the single 
robbery was split into two robberies—each upgraded to first-degree-felony aggravated 
robbery for the use of a dangerous weapon. See supra at Part I. As discussed in Section 
I, private counsel argued against this error below, thereby properly preserving it for 
appeal. See kL Second, each aggravated robbery was enhanced again for use of a 
dangerous weapon. See R. 315-16; 369. Private counsel made no effort to prevent the 
enhancement of the aggravated robbery charges, not for some strategic reason, but 
because he had simply overlooked the issue. R. 369:10-11. Had private counsel 
adequately prepared for sentencing by preparing to argue against the imposition of the 
dangerous weapon enhancements, then counsel could have ensured Irvin's aggravated 
robbery charges would not have been subject to the dangerous weapon enhancement 
statute, thereby eliminating one or two of the three additional punishments improperly 
imposed for Irvin's alleged use of a dangerous weapon. Id, 
B. Private Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance By Failing to Object to the 
State's Admission of Anecdotal Statistical Evidence, 
First, as explained above, in order to "prevail on the first prong of the [Strickland] 
test, a defendant 'must identify specific acts or omissions demonstrating that counsel's 
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representation failed to meet an objective standard of reasonableness.'" Montoya, 2004 
UT 5 at TJ24 (citation omitted). In this case, private counsel performed deficiently when 
he failed to object to the State's admission of anecdotal statistical evidence. 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403. A "trial court may find evidence to be unfairly 
prejudicial, and therefore inadmissible, if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses a 
sense of horror, provokes the instinct to punish, or otherwise may cause the jury to based 
its decision on something other than the established propositions of the case." State v. 
Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations and quotations omitted). 
For example, in State v. Rammel 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986), a witness "initially 
denied any involvement" in the crime but "later admitted that he had been the driver." 
Rammel 721 P.2d at 499. At trial, a detective testified, based on his "experience 
interviewing several hundred criminal suspects," "that he did not consider it unusual for 
[the witness] to lie to him when . . . first interrogated" because "most suspects lie when 
initially questioned by police." Id at 500. On appeal, our supreme court determined the 
trial court erred in admitting the detective's testimony. Id. at 500-01. "[T]he prosecution 
attempted to establish, in effect, that there was a high statistical probability that [the 
witness] lied." Id at 501. "Even where statistically valid probability evidence has been 
presented—and [the detective's] testimony hardly qualifies as such—courts have 
routinely excluded it when the evidence invites the jury to focus upon a seemingly 
scientific, numerical conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence before it and decide 
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where truth lies." IdL at 501 (citation omitted). "Probabilities cannot conclusively 
establish that a single event did or did not occur and are particularly inappropriate when 
used to establish facts 'not susceptible to quantitative analysis/ such as whether a 
particular individual is telling the truth at any given time." IdL (citations omitted). 
Similarly, in State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the victim delayed 
reporting sexual abuse for "two and a half years." Iorg, 801 P.2d at 939. At trial, a 
deputy testified that "fifty percent of the thirty victims she had interviewed delayed 
reporting for over a year," and said it was her opinion that delay did not indicate 
fabrication. IcL On appeal, this Court held the trial court erred by admitting the deputy's 
testimony because the Utah Supreme Court has "continued to condemn anecdotal 
'statistical' evidence concerning matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis such as 
witness veracity." Id. at 941. 
In this case, Irvin claimed he fled from police not because he was guilty of the 
robbery, but because he knew he had an outstanding warrant. R. 366:92; 367:36-37. To 
discredit this claim, the State presented anecdotal statistical evidence that 90 percent of 
people who flee say they fled not because they were guilty of a particular crime, but 
because they had warrants. R. 366:155. The foundation for this evidence was utterly 
lacking. IdL "There was no showing that the anecdotal data from which [Officer 
Anderson] drew his conclusions had any statistical validity. Nor was there any evidence 
to establish that [his] experience uniquely qualified him as an expert . . . to give such 
testimony." Rammel 721 P.2d at 501. In fact, the testimony was even less reliable than 
the testimony presented in Rammel because it was based on information gathered from a 
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"dozen, give or take" foot chases, R. 366:155, rather than from the interviews of "several 
hundred criminal suspects." Rammel, 721 P.2d at 500. 
Moreover, the evidence "invited the jury to draw inferences about" the credibility 
of Irvin's defense based not on the evidence, but on Officer Anderson's "past experience 
with other suspects." Rammel, 721 P.2d at 500. In fact, the only purpose of the 
testimony was "to establish, in effect, that there was a high statistical probability that" 
Irvin's defense was a fabrication. Id. at 501. As such, it fell squarely within the category 
of evidence that "courts have routinely excluded" under rule 403 because it "invites the 
jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion rather than to analyze the 
evidence before it and decide where truth lies." Id, (citation omitted). 
The record reveals no strategic reason for allowing the State to admit the anecdotal 
statistical testimony without qualifying Officer Anderson as an expert, providing any 
foundation, or demonstrating how the probative value of the evidence could possibly 
outweigh its prejudicial effect. R. 366:155. In fact, private counsel allowed the evidence 
to come in without ever even trying to find out whether it was "true or not." R. 367:36. 
Thus, private counsel provided deficient performance by allowing the anecdotal 
statistical evidence to be admitted without objection, even though it was inadmissible 
under rule 403. 
Second, as explained above, in order to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland 
test, a defendant must show that "but for counsel's deficient performance there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different." 
Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at [^23 (citations omitted). In this case, there is a reasonable 
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probability the outcome of the trial would have been different if private counsel had 
objected to the State's inadmissible anecdotal statistical evidence. 
In Iorg, this Court held the State's introduction of anecdotal statistical evidence 
"clearly calculated to bolster" the victim's credibility was prejudicial error because the 
"case hinged on credibility." Iorg, 801 P.2d at 941-42. "Since this case depended on the 
jury's assessment of the victim's credibility versus the defendant's, and there is not 'other 
evidence [to support] the defendant's conviction,' beyond that which is tainted by [the] 
improper testimony," this Court could not say "that absent the error there [was] not a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result to the defendant." Id at 942 (citations 
omitted). 
Similarly-, in this case, there was no eyewitness identification linking Irvin to the 
robbery. R. 366-67. The State's proof of identification relied entirely on circumstantial 
evidence gathered from Irvin's physical appearance at the traffic stop. Id. Irvin's 
defense against this circumstantial evidence was to show it was the product of 
happenstance, not guilt. R. 366:92; 367:36-37. In order to prove his defense, Irvin took 
the enormous gamble of introducing evidence of his outstanding warrant. R. 366:158; 
see State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988) (noting prior bad acts evidence 
"tends to skew or corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding process" and leads the finder of 
fact to convict on "an improper basis"); Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Because he knew he had 
an outstanding warrant, he had a reason to flee from the police other than guilt. R. 
366:92; 367:36-37. But the State robbed Irvin of the force of his gamble by introducing 
foundationless anecdotal statistical evidence to suggest Irvin must have been lying about 
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the reason he fled because a "dozen more or less" other people had told such lies. R. 
366:155; 367:35. Absent this baseless attack, there was a reasonable probability that the 
jury would have viewed the circumstantial evidence relied on by the State as the result of 
unhappy happenstance rather than guilt. IcL Thus, this Court should reverse because 
there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for private counsel's 
deficient performance in failing to object to the State's anecdotal statistical evidence. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT'S IMPOSITION OF THE DANGEROUS WEAPONS 
ENHANCMENTS RESULTED IN AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure says a "court may correct an 
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. 
P. 22(e). This rule allows an appellate court to "'review the legality of a sentence'" even 
if "the issue was not raised in the trial court." State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,Tff7-8, 994 
P.2d 1243; see State v.Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995). As explained above, the 
trial court's decision to present to the jury two aggravated robbery charges, rather than 
one, and then to impose dangerous weapon enhancements on both charges violated the 
double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Utah constitutions. See supra at Parts I 
& II. This error resulted in Irvin receiving two terms of six years to life, rather than one 
term of five years to life. See id Because the trial court's error resulted in an 
unconstitutional sentence, this Court should correct the sentence pursuant to rule 22(e). 
CONCLUSION 
Irvin respectfully requests this Court to reverse and remand his case to the trial 
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court for a new trial on a single charge of aggravated robbery, with an order to refrain 
from enhancing the aggravated robbery charge if Irvin's new trial results in a conviction. 
SUBMITTED this \ \ day of December, 2006. 
i^^i^'Pf* 
LORI JrSfcPPf ^ ' / 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
t ime of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 12 - Rights of Accused Persons 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use 
of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-401 (2003) 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder of 
offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single 
criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is 
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section 
77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal 
proceedings. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402 (2003) 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses, 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offer se charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the c ffense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sou phi by the defendant. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-301 (Supp. 2005) 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with 
a purpose or intent to deprive the person fermanently or temporarily of 
the personal property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly Vges force or fear of immedi-
ate force against another in the course of comaitting a theft or wrongful 
appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of comnitting a theft or wrongful 
appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft
 0r wrongful appropria-
tion; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-302 (2003) 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: . 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in bection 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
 ( 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be m the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.8 (Supp. 2005) 
76-3-2G3.8. Increase of sentence if dangerous weapon 
used. 
(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as in 
Section 76-1-601. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court: 
(a) (i) shall increase by one year the minimum term of the sentence 
applicable by law; and 
(ii) if the minimum term applicable by law is zero, shall set the 
minimum term as one year; and 
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable by law 
in the case of a felony of the second or third degree. 
(3) A defendant who is a party to a felony offense shall be sentenced to the 
increases in punishment provided in Subsection (2^  if the trier of fact finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(a) a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony; and 
(b) the defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present. 
(4) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a person has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous weapon 
was used in the commission of or furtherance bf the felony and that person is 
subsequently convicted of another felony in which a dangerous weapon was 
used in the commission of or furtherance of the felony, the court shall, in 
addi&on to any other sentence imposed including those in Subsection (2), 
impose an indeterminate prison term to be not less than five nor more than ten 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of t ime. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \^\ 
Under the law of the State of Utah, robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against 
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, that person uses or tlireatens to use a dangerous weapon; or causes 
serious bodily injury upon another. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Roy Drake Irvin , of the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery as charged in count I of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable-doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 3rd day of July, 2005, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
defendant, Roy Drake Irvin , took personal property then in the possession of Fast Track 
Convenience Store , from the person or immediate presence of Fast Track Convenience Store ; 
and 
2. That such taking was unlawful; 
3. That such taking was intentional; 
4. That such taking was against the will of Fast Track Convenience Store; 
5. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or fear; and 
6. That in the course of committing such taking, a dangerous weapon was used. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged in count I of the infomiation. If, on 
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must fmd the defendant not guilty of count I. 
w 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ \ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Roy Drake Irvin , of the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery as charged in count II of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 3rd day of July, 2005, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
defendant, Roy Drake Irvin , took personal property then in the possession of Teresa Celis, from 
the person or immediate presence of Teresa Celis; and 
2. That such taking was unlawful; 
3. That such taking was intentional; 
4. That such taking was against the will of Teresa Celis ; 
5. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or fear; and 
6. That in the course of committing such taking, a dangerous weapon was used. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged in count II of the information a»& 
yeunDod flot oonoidor'aay altarr^ turrit fnffrmfti.. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty of count II, Aggravated Robbery. Yon mnythnn rnrnirinrthr guilt nf thr 
jjlgfondmil Willi lespiut to the alternate Cuuiil II, Tliufl uf uu Qpciable Motoi1 Vohioloj-apchargodi 
Jn ,lliu iu.ri.MmHlii.nf. 
TabD 
solely on the nature of what's taken. 
And then the other point I want to make has to do 
with the robbery statute itself. The robbery statute requires 
"taking from the person or immediate presence of the person by 
force or fear." There was no force or fear used to take the 
money — or to take the money from the person that that money 
belonged to. And I don't know the gentleman's name, the store 
owner, nothing was taken from him by force or fear. That would 
be, as far as he is concerned, merely a theft. If money that 
belonged to him was taken from him and the person had the 
intent to permanently deprive him of it, there was a theft from 
that person. 
The only robbery that occurred was from the clerk. 
The money that was in her care and the car that was hers and 
that was one robbery. A continuing course of conduct, 
continuing fear where multiple things were taken, that's a 
single robbery. It's not a robbery of the person who owned the 
money. If anything, it's a theft. 
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Whether there were two separate crimes that are 
charged separately even though they may be in a single criminal 
episode — and I look at a single criminal episode is just a 
procedural matter. Single criminal episode you try them all at 
once, if you can't you try them separately. But it seems to me 
the better rationale has to be here that certainly a robbery 
has to occur, and it can only occur when the property is taken 
from a person. 
In this case we have a — we have a robbery, and 
Mr. Irvin came into the store and he took the property that was 
owned by the store owner — who wasn't there, but under the 
care, custody or control of his employee who was there — by 
force or fear. I agree with the State at that point in time, 
that crime ends as far as the robbery is concerned. If 
something had have happened in the back room besides just 
taking her keys, then everybody agrees it would be another 
crime. But at that point in time, after the force and fear are 
necessary to get the cash out of the cash register is 
concluded, he takes her in the back room, the force and fear 
continues and she gives up the keys to her car. 
Now, granted it's the same person from whom the 
property was taken. If it wasn't, the second charge wouldn't 
be a robbery it would be something else. But her property was 
taken from her against her will by force or fear and that is 
her automobile. And I think that constitutes a separate crime. 
25 
And the reason I do say that is in the circumstances 
of this case, and each case turns on its own, factually anyway, 
but it just seems to me once the initial crime is completed, 
the robbery — taking the money by force and fear — is 
completed and then there's a second type of property taken 
from — in this case, this is her personal property, this isn't 
her property that's being taken that she has charge of as an 
employee — and through force and fear, you've got a second 
crime. 
So accordingly I deny the defense motion. It's an 
interesting question and perhaps it ought to be visited in the 
appellate courts and they'll certainly tell me if it is or not. 
I have no question about that. So in any event I'm going to 
deny the motion. When I sentence on this matter I'll be 
sentencing on two robberies. 
I'll ask the State to prepare an order. And please, 
in the order set forth what I've said here as to why I think 
State's position is correct so when the appellate court takes a 
look at it if they choose to they can see the order without any 
question and see why I did what I did. And if I'm wrong, then 
I'm wrong. 
MR. FISHER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, gentleman. I'll see you 
pretty soon. Sentencing is on the 9th of June? Yes. Okay. 
I'll see you then. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
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ROY DRAKE IRVIN, JR., 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 051904377FS 
Hon. Timothy R. Hansen 
This Court presided over trial in the above-entitled matter on March 28-29, 2006. 
At the conclusion of that trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, including 
two counts of Aggravated Robbery. Defendant subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate 
Conviction for Aggravated Robbery, which came before this Court for hearing on May 
11, 2006. Present at said hearing were the defendant, his attorney, Nyal C. Bodily, and 
Deputy District Attorney T. Langdon Fisher. Prior to the hearing, the Court had received 
the defendant's motion and accompanying memorandum, and the State's response 
thereto. Oral arguments by both parties were presented in open court. Based on the 
evidence presented at trial and on the parties' memoranda and arguments, the Court 
enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. 
DAVE) E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
T. LANGDON FISHER, 5694 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
State v. Roy Drake Irvin, Jr., court case no. 051904377 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 2 of 3 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant entered the Fastback Convenience Store in Salt Lake County ("the 
store" and held a knife against the store clerk, C.S. ("the victim"), to induce her to 
open the store cash register. The defendant then took money from the register that 
was under the victim's care and control, but which belonged to the store owner. 
2. Still in possession of the knife, the defendant then told the victim to give him her car 
keys. He then took her to the back of the store, talked about tying her up, and told her 
to stay in the back of the store when he left. These actions—taking the victim's car 
keys, removing her to the back of the store, talking about tying her up, and telling her 
to stay put—were committed to facilitate taking the victim's personal vehicle. The 
defendant left the building and drove away in the victim's personal vehicle. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Taking the money from the store cash register completed the first, separate offense of 
Aggravated Robbery. 
2. The defendant began a second, separate offense of Aggravated Robbery when he took 
the victim's personal car keys, removed her to the back of the store, talked about 
tying her up, and told her to stay there. When he then took the victim's motor vehicle, 
the defendant completed the second, separate offense of Aggravated Robbery. 
State v. Roy Drake Irvm, Jr., court case no 051904377 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 3 of 3 
ORDER 
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law as outlined above, 
the defendant's Motion to Vacate Conviction for Aggravated Robbery is denied. 
DATED this 
READ AND APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Nyal C. Bodily 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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THE COURT: HOW DO WE KNOW THAT? 
ORTEGA: THAT'S THE INFORMATION MR. FISHER LEFT 
IN THE FILE. CAN GET PROOF OF THAT TO THE COURT, BUT HE 
4 I INDICATED THAT uO MAS STOLEN FROM THE CONVENIENCE STORE 
5 AND 212.50 WAS FOR THE VICTIM'S LOST WAGES. THAT'S WHAT HE 
6 WROTE IN HIS NOTES. 
7 THE COURT: FASTRAC'S GOT $1105.00 COMING. DO YOU 
8 I AGREE WITH THAT? 
MS. ORTEGA: WHAT WAS THAT? 
THE COURT: 105.00? 
ORTEGA i ,-,::: ~ .^ :ORRECT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. AND THEN 212.50 TO MS. CELIS? 
M.'.;. ORTEGA: CORRECT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. IS THERE ANY LEGAL REASON I SHOULD 
- MT IML'UiiE SENTENCE AT THIS TIME? 
MR. BODILY: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
TUN f.'Mlll.'l I GUESS, I'll I.J.IVE YOU All OPPORTUNITY In 
BE HEARD ON WHETHER OR NOT THE YEAR ENHANCEMENT APPLIES TO THIS 
SENTENCJ.'::, WHIVH WOI.UX) MAKE 'IVll^  SIX TO LIFE AS OPPOSED TO FTVK 
O LIFE. IS THERE ANY REASON THAT SHOULDN'T APPLY PURSUANT TO 
6-3-203 SUB(8)? 
MR. BODILY: YOUR HONOR, I HAVEN'T LOOKED AT THAT. 
!AN I TAKE A MINUTE T "'- ? 
THE COURT: LOOK AT IT IN DUE COURSE. BUT I'M GOING 
V > IMPOSE IT I l''\ FOR TiOMK REASOli, i UF.FA > TO CHANGE IT T ' LL 
10 
RECONSIDER IT. 
MR. BODILY: I DON'T BELIEVE THERE'S ANY REASON NOT 
TO IMPOSE IT AT THIS POINT. 
THE COURT: I'M SORRY? 
MR. BODILY: I DON'T KNOW OF ANY REASON NOT TO IMPOSE 
IT AT THIS POINT. 
THE COURT: MR. IRVIN, HAVING BEEN CONVICTED BY A 
JURY OF TWO COUNTS OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, 1ST DEGREE FELONIES, 
INVOLVING THE USE OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON, SPECIFICALLY A KNIFE, 
ON EACH COUNT IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT THAT YOU BE 
INCARCERATED IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON FOR THE TERM PRESCRIBED 
BY LAW FOR THOSE TWO CONVICTIONS OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
AND BECAUSE YOU USED A DANGEROUS WEAPON, THEY ARE, 
EACH IS ENHANCED ONE YEAR ON THE BOTTOM, WHICH MAKES IT A SIX 
TO LIFE SENTENCE ON EACH COUNT. AND THAT'S THE ORDER OF THIS 
COURT. 
I ALSO IMPOSE A $1500.00 FINE ON EACH COUNT. 
AND I ALSO ORDER RESTITUTION TO THERESA CELIS IN THE 
AMOUNT OF $212.50. AND RESTITUTION TO FASTRAC, THE CONVENIENCE 
STORE, WHOSE MONEY WAS TAKEN, IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,105.00. 
APPARENTLY THERE IS NO RESTITUTION OWING ON 
22 | MS. CELIS' CAR THAT YOU TOOK THAT DAY. 
HAVING PLED GUILTY TO — OR NOT HAVING PLED GUILTY, 
HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BY A JURY OF FAILURE TO STOP AT AN 


























Q. Okay. You said you've been an officer for ten years. 
Have you ever been — you were in a foot chase this night, have 
you ever been in any other foot chases? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it's a long career. Can you put a number, an 
approximate number of the number of foot chases you have been 
involved in? 
A. Um, maybe a dozen, give or take. 
Q. Okay. And how often did you catch your man? 
' I think I've only had one get away from me. 
y. Did you have a chance to talk to the people you 
caught? 
A. Every one. 
Q. And do you ever ask them why they ran? 
A. Typically, they say because they thought they had 
warrants. 
Q. What you do you mean by typically, what percentage of 
the time do you get that answer? 
A. Probably 90 percent of the time if you ask, "Why did 
you run?" They will say, "Because I have warrants." 
MR. VO-DUC: That's all I have for now, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination, Mr. Bodily? 
MR. BODILY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
"k "k ~k 
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